Abstract Umbrella branding is a marketing practice whereby multi-product rms leverage their reputation across dierent product categories. This paper investigates how advertising in the market of over-the-counter (OTC) drugs aects the decision to buy prescription drugs from a promoted brand name. I exploit specic characteristics of market regulation in Germany to identify the eect of advertising and nd positive eects of umbrella branding on sales of prescription drugs. Umbrella branding results in market expansion, particularly for generic rms which invest in OTC drug advertising. If the eect leads to more consumers of generic substitutes or to more patients in undertreated therapeutic areas, market expansion can have a positive eect on welfare.
Introduction
Umbrella branding extends the reputation of multi-product rms across unrelated product categories. The marketing practice of linking reputation across products or services is particularly relevant for experience goods, such as in health care markets. For example, consumers of pharmaceuticals are typically not well-informed about the quality (eectiveness) of the good; their awareness and quality perception may be inuenced by the reputation of the rm. A common brand name that links products in the minds of consumers is benecial for rms because it allows them to send more credible signals about quality (Choi, 1998; Nelson, 1974; Bagwell, 2007) . Deviations from producing high quality, even for one product, result in prot losses for the whole product portfolio.
1
The empirical problem in identifying the eect of umbrella branding is to isolate the causal eect of the reputation of a brand name across markets. Particularly problematic are confounding factors interfering with the spillover eect, such as direct advertising or other supply-side factors like quality (Bronnenberg et al., 2012; Dubois et al., 2014) . To address these empirical issues, I exploit an institutional detail of the German pharmaceutical industry, a market with strict advertising regulations for prescription drugs and more liberal regulation for OTC drugs.
2 The brand name spillover from OTC to prescription drugs works purely through reputation since information provision about prescription drugs is prohibited by law. The setting isolates the eect of umbrella branding on sales net of any other marketing eects.
3
I investigate how the probability of buying a prescription drug varies with the exposure of consumers to non-prescription drug advertising. An instrumental variable approach addresses issues from endogenous choices of advertising. In particular, I exploit the exogenous variation in the timing of the advertising of OTC drugs. Data on the advertising of OTC drugs show seasonal patterns and peaks of expenditures in each November (Nielsen 1 Tirole (1996) shows that employees of a manufacturer also have incentives to maintain a high quality and, thus, the reputation of the brand name.
2 Consumer-directed advertising is not allowed in Germany as in any other OECD country with the exception of the US and New Zealand. In the US, several academic medical centers have implemented policies to ban the exposure of doctors to advertising (detailing) as an eort to address conicts of interest (Larkin et al., 2017) . On the contrary, OTC drug advertising aimed at patients is legal in many jurisdictions (OECD, 2010) . 3 For example, the multi-product rm Bayer sells several prescription and OTC drugs, such as Adempas or Aspirin. Each package in the portfolio depicts the brand logo (compare Appendix A (5)). Media, 2012) . The seasonality in advertising for OTC drugs correlates with the season of colds and the u, two common categories in the OTC drugs market.
Seasonal consumption patterns do not aect sales in my empirical analysis, since it focuses on prescription drugs to treat chronic diseases (diabetes, epilepsy, and Alzheimer's disease). In a reduced-form sales equation, I investigate the eects of advertising OTC drugs on the sales of prescription drugs. I measure reputation by the stock of past advertising expenditures, which also captures the long-lived eects of the advertising on consumption patterns. My results indicate positive spillover eects of advertising of OTC drugs on prescription drug demand.
A structural model complements the empirical analysis and quanties the economic eects more precisely. I estimate prescription drug demand and allow advertising spillovers from the OTC drug market to aect the utility of the consumer (Berry et al., 1995) .
Using data from the therapeutic market for Alzheimer's disease drugs in Germany, I
estimate that consumers place a positive value on OTC drug advertising. On the supply side, I assume Bertrand-Nash pricing of multi-product rms and simulate new optimal prices and quantities in the counterfactual equilibrium without advertising spillovers. My simulation shows that umbrella branding expands the market for AD drugs, i.e., the share of annually treated patients increases by about 10 percent. In particular, generic manufacturers expand their sales more than originators.
4 The results are driven by the larger stock of advertising expenditures of generic manufacturers in the OTC drug market, on average e7.2m, compared to an average of e2.26m by originators.
The literature helps to explain the dierent responses of the two rm types to advertising. First, advertising allows generic manufacturers to inform patients about alternative brands in formerly monopolistic markets (Königbauer, 2007; Hurwitz and Caves, 1988) , and it overcomes brand loyalty and switching costs (Shum, 2004; Crawford and Shum, 2005) . Some generic rms dierentiate their products through advertising, a strategy to avoid price competition among generics (Berndt and Newhouse, 2012; Reien and Ward, 2007) . Second, originators advertise so as to dierentiate their products from therapeutic alternatives or to respond to generic entry (Rizzo, 1999; Bhattacharya and Vogt, 2003; Caves et al., 1991; EUC, 2009 ).
4 I dene drug manufacturers as originators who invest in R&D and generic rms who bring copies of no-longer-patented drugs to the market. In addition, European trade policies make imported versions of originator drugs available. In my paper, all drugs can advertise and accumulate brand reputation.
Advertising spillovers from unregulated to regulated markets can pose a threat to the health status of consumers if, for example, umbrella branding leads to misguided drug choices (FDA, 2014; ISMP, 2015) . Regulation of pharmaceuticals is fragmented in the US: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC ) oversees OTC drugs and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prescription drugs. Thus, the eciency of regulation in pharmaceutical markets could benet from more coordinated policies. The eects of advertising spillovers on social welfare, however, are dicult to quantify and depend on market characteristics. If patients of under-treated diseases, such as Alzheimer's disease, receive more medications, advertising spillovers would have a positive eect. In contrast, market expansion through advertising can be harmful for over-prescribed medications, such as opioids (Alpert et al., 2017) .
My results are more general. Indeed, umbrella branding and advertising regulation are also relevant in other industries. For example, regulators implement advertising bans to protect consumers in markets such as cigarettes (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000) or junk food (Dubois et al., 2014) . From a policy perspective, umbrella branding poses challenges to regulators if rms bypass advertising restrictions by linking reputation across regulated and unregulated markets. An example is the beer industry in India: since advertising for alcohol was banned it instead advertises soft drinks and drinking water (Prasad, 2009). Related Literature Theoretical work emphasizes the role of umbrella branding when introducing a new product (Choi, 1998; Wernerfelt, 1988) , in markets with repeated purchases (Cabral, 2000) , and as a substitute for external certicates (Hakenes and Peitz, 2009 ). Empirical work identies umbrella branding in industries other than pharmaceuticals (Erdem, 1998; Balachander and Ghose, 2003; Erdem and Sun, 2002; Erdem, 1998) , e.g., in the form of celebrity endorsement on book sales of the same author (Garthwaite, 2014) . My article estimates a structural model to quantify the eects of umbrella branding and proposes a new identication strategy for advertising spillovers. Ling et al. (2002) analyses how the marketing of a prescription drug aects the subsequent sales of drugs after its status has switched from prescription to non-prescription (Rx-to-OTC switch). The authors nd positive spillover eects of prescription drug marketing earlier in the life cycle of drugs on sales after the Rx-to-OTC switch. My work does not investigate Rx-to-OTC switches and proposes the utilization of institutional characteristics outside the US to isolate the eect of reputation from other marketing eorts. Various articles on pharmaceutical markets nd mostly positive eects of advertising on drug demand and market shares (Lakdawalla et al., 2013; Avery et al., 2012; Ching et al., 2015; Iizuka, 2004; Ling et al., 2002) . Several authors investigate advertising spillovers in pharmaceutical markets, e.g., Shapiro (forthcoming) estimates the positive eects from rm-specic advertising on the market level. Lakdawalla et al. (2013) nd that the introduction of Medicare Part D, the US federal drug insurance program for the elderly, increases advertising expenditures which aects drug demand outside the Medicare program. Authors of the medical literature investigate the eects of spillovers on compliance (Wosinska, 2005; Donohue et al., 2007) and on doctor visits (Iizuka and Jin, 2007) . My focus on the spillovers of the advertising of OTC drugs complements earlier work by emphasizing a new dimension of umbrella branding.
Although the empirical IO literature oers models that emphasize consumer heterogeneity (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001) , there are relatively few applications to the complex and diverse market structures of pharmaceuticals. Notable exceptions are Kaiser et al. (2014) who analyze a reference price policy in Denmark, Dubois and Lasio (2014) who estimate the economic eects of price constraints in France, Lasio (2015) who estimates the impact of de-listing from insurance coverage, (Duso et al., 2014) who quantify the eects of parallel imports, and work by Dunn (2012) and Dutta (2011) on pharmaceutical innovations. My work models advertising as a characteristic and simulates a ban on advertising to quantify the economic eects of umbrella branding.
Institutional Setting and Umbrella Branding
Germany, like all European countries, prohibits prescription drug marketing toward patients. Regulation, however, does allow OTC drug advertising which was 12.6 percent of sales in 2010 in Germany (Nielsen Media, 2012) . TV aired the most advertising (56%) and newspapers (34%). The product categories with the most advertising expenditures in 2011 are cough and cold remedies (e141m), analgesics (e108m), and relaxant agents (e81m) (Nielsen Media, 2012) .
OTC drugs are available without prescriptions and patients choose from the shelf space or after expert advice from the pharmacist. OTC drugs are behind-the-counter products, i.e., are only available in pharmacies. The similarity of the place and procedure in buying OTC and prescription drug allows us to study eects at the border of the two markets.
In Germany, all approved prescription drugs are reimbursed by the public health insurance. It covers about 70 million insurees or about 85 percent of the total population (BMG, 2015) . In contrast to the US, insurance plans do not dier among insurees 5 and the providers are directly reimbursed for products and services. Supermarkets or physician oces do not dispense drugs in Germany. Patients co-pay 10 percent per package, with a minimum of e5 and a maximum of e10. There are no deductibles or coverage gaps in the insurance plans. A uniform incentive and payment scheme for all pharmacists and physicians across Germany mitigates agency problems associated with third-party payers.
Physicians are free in their drug choices and can either prescribe a product (and package size and strength) or an active ingredient. Reimbursement of physicians is independent of their prescription behavior. Neither insurance policies nor pharmacists can overrule the decision of the physician (aut-item regulation).
6 If the physician prescribes a molecule, the pharmacy has to oer one of the three cheapest products. Margins of pharmacists are regulated as a xed fee plus 3 percent of the list price. Margins of wholesalers are regulated, too, and provide disincentives for stock-piling of pharmacies. Until 2011, rms were free to set prices and the public health insurance reimbursed the full list price of the drug. In some therapeutic markets, reimbursement policies set incentives for rms to decrease the price of generic drugs, e.g., reference prices or co-payments.
In Germany, promotional activities for prescription drugs comprise visits of sales representative to physicians (detailing), free samples, and sponsored marketing conferences.
While free samples are a pure economic incentive, detailing and conferences might provide physicians with information (Ching and Ishihara, 2010) . Earlier work shows that detailing may have business stealing eects, while consumer-directed advertising result in market-expansion (Ling et al., 2002; Iizuka, 2004; Iizuka and Jin, 2007; Ching et al., 2015) . 7 I do not observe detailing and I use instruments for consumer-directed advertising in OTC drug markets to address the issues of the omitted variable. 8 5 Patients may augment their uniform public health plan with a private health plan. Public health plans, however, cover nearly all the pharmaceutical expenses of prescription drugs.
6 Physicians face a non-binding prescription cost benchmark with neighboring colleagues. Physicians, however, renegotiate the benchmarks individually and regulators enforce them poorly (Schwermann et al., 2003) . I assume that the prescription benchmark is a weak incentive for physicians to prescribe lower-priced pharmaceuticals.
7 Mizik and Jacobson (2004) estimate that one additional prescription needs about 1.56.5 visits of a sales representative or 6.573 samples per visit. 8 If observed consumer-directed OTC drug advertising and unobserved physician-directed prescription drug advertising (or their timing) are not perfectly correlated, the empirical ndings are identied. To 9 Advertising seems to be correlated with a seasonal demand pattern in the OTC market, a fact also emphasized by Ling et al. (2002) . Waves of advertising are common in many industries and are referred to as a pulsing strategy, whereby advertising peaks within a few weeks and drops thereafter (Dubé et al., 2005) .
10
Figure 1 also shows sales of prescription drugs to treat epilepsy, diabetes, and AD dierentiated by rms investing in OTC drug advertising (solid line) and non-advertising rms (dashed line). Over time, advertising rms gain market shares. The gure shows there are also increases in sales during or shortly after advertising peaks and signs of inter-temporal substitution, since sales for advertising brands decrease after the peak.
The sales peaks are clearer between 2004 and 2007 and fuzzier toward the end of the observation period. Patients seem to test drugs which invest in advertising during or after the advertising peak periods. The upward trend of advertising drugs indicates that some my knowledge, no study of the pharmaceutical industry reports seasonality in detailing: a large sector inquiry of the European Union reveals market entry and life-cycle management of drugs as drivers of detailing (EUC, 2009 ). Furthermore, a study of ACE inhibitor on diuretics in Canada from 1993 to 1999 does not nd any seasonal peak in detailing, e.g., Figure 1 in Ching and Ishihara (2012) . 9 A second, smaller peak occurs in spring (March), a common season for hay fever and colds. 10 Individual-level purchase decisions and advertising exposure, e.g., number and length of consumed commercials, would allow me to identify the eect of advertising spillovers directly. I assume an evenly distributed advertising exposure which is constant over time and media exposure to be exogenous, e.g., patients who search for prescription drug information are equally exposed to OTC advertising. I estimate sales of product j in time t, S jt , as a function of advertising of rm f , a f t :
where the function f (j) indicates the rm f selling the product j. ψ t denote time xedeects and jt are error terms. Product xed-eects, χ j , control for time-invariant product characteristics and help to identify the mean eect of advertising on sales (Bronnenberg and Dubé, forthcoming) . Because consumers keep marketing activities in mind, rm reputation possibly depends on all advertising expenditures in past periods (Lakdawalla et al., 2013; Berndt et al., 2003) . I construct advertising stocks as the depreciated expenditure of past periods plus current advertising expenditures (Dubois et al., 2014) . Equation 2 models the advertising vector of rm f in period t as:
where stocks of advertising from the last period, a f t−1 , depreciates with rate λ and e f t denotes investments in advertising in period t. Since depreciation rates are not observed, I follow Lakdawalla et al. (2013) and run a grid search for the optimal depreciation rate.
I therefore estimate market share equation 1 and choose the best model t, i.e., minimal mean squared errors. I nd a yearly depreciation rate of 42.5 percent on advertising which is in range of previous research.
11
I instrument advertising spillovers by exploiting the timing of seasonal illnesses, like the u. I expect the seasonality to be correlated with OTC drug advertising (compare Tables   1 and 7 show the strong correlation of the instrument with the stock of advertising. The columns present the eect of advertising (stock) on sales in quantities (daily doses). The instrument for advertising stocks are the stocks of season (column IV). The second part present the coecient from the rst stage. Constants are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the product level and presented in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. and AD drugs. Sales, S jf t are measured in quantities (dened daily doses or DDD). The coecients for the stock of advertising are positive and signicant across the OLS estimation in column (OLS ) and after controlling for endogeneity (column IV ). I nd that a 10 percent increase in the non-prescription drug advertising stock increases sales of prescription drugs by .5 percent. The results compare to estimates of the elasticities of direct-to-consumer advertising of 7.5 percent in the US. Direct advertising transmits information on products, molecules, and brand names (Berndt et al., 1995) and is expected to have a stronger eect than spillovers. The total eect of spillovers are most likely larger because rms can potentially realize spillovers in more therapeutic markets. Column (IV ) also presents results of the rst stage. The coecient is positive and statistically signicant. Also, the F-test is above the critical value (Stock et al., 2002) .
3 Econometric Model I estimate a random coecient logit demand model (Berry et al., 1995) that accommodates advertising spillovers from OTC markets as a complementary characteristic. On the supply side, I assume oligopolistic competition and calculate elasticities, margins, and marginal costs. The counterfactual analysis calculates equilibrium outcomes like price, quantities, and consumer surplus in a market without advertising spillovers and compares it to the status quo equilibrium.
To investigate the economic eects of umbrella branding on one therapeutic market, the empirical analysis focuses on the prescription drug market for the Alzheimer's disease.
Its descriptive statistics are similar to the total sample, i.e., the correlation of advertising expenditures and sales is .312 * * * (< .01). Furthermore, the results of the reduced-form equation 1 for the AD drug market resemble the results for the total market.
Data
The market for Alzheimer's disease drugs in Germany included 106 dierent products and 54 rms between 2004 and 2010. The sample contains information on seven drugs from innovators, 45 imported innovative drugs, 12 and 54 generics. The market is com-12 Imported originator drugs (parallel imports) are the result of free trade and public pharmaceutical price regulation in the European Union (Duso et al., 2014) . prised of six molecules: donepezil, galantamine, ginkgo biloba, memantine, piracetam, and rivastigmine. 13 Two of the molecules are o-patent and four are patented. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by originator drugs, imports, and generics. The statistics show the importance of OTC advertising for generic drug manufacturers: on average, 67 percent of generic rms invest in advertising. The amount of advertising stock, however, diers substantially: originators possess e2.2m as stock of advertising and generic rms e7.3m. Importers possess less stock with an average of e70,000. Importing rms focus on the trade of (formerly) patented products and, to my knowledge, there is no import rm marketing OTC products.
14 Most drugs from originators and importers (71% and 76%) are sold in markets under patent protection. The market structure results in almost eightfold higher prices of drugs of originators than those of generic manufacturers. The latter face, on average, 26 competitors per molecule. In dierent strengths, the molecule ginkgo biloba is also available as an OTC drug (which is not eligible for reimbursement under the public health insurance). Patients receive a reimbursement for ginkgo biloba if they follow the same procedure as for a prescription drug: they obtain a prescription from the physician, hand their prescription to the pharmacist, and co-pay. Also, pharmacies receive the same reimbursement for prescribed ginkgo biloba as for all other prescribed drugs. Firms, however, could publicly advertise low-dosage versions of drugs that the public health insurance reimburses in a high-dosage presentation.
I assume that high-dosage presentations are dierent products, nd that advertising for non-prescription AD drugs is minor, and discuss results from a robustness check w/o ginkgo biloba in section 5. 15 Table 5 indicates in column AD Drug which rm sells Alzheimer's disease drugs. The OTC rm Klosterfrau spends, on average, almost e5m per month on advertising, followed by the originators Novartis and the OTC rm Schwabe. Firms tend to adjust advertising to market dynamics and the table shows a large variance of advertising expenditure across 13 All international clinical guidelines recommend the rst-line pharmacological treatment options cholinesterase inhibitors (donepezil, galantamine and rivastigmine ) and memantine (DGPPN (2015) for Germany; or Winslow et al. (2011) and Qaseem et al. (2008) for the US). German physicians frequently prescribe Piracetam and high-dosage ginkgo biloba for AD patients in Germany (DGPPN, 2015) .
14 In addition, some rms also import medical equipment which they might advertise sparsely. The expenditures include billboard advertising, for example, sponsoring local sporting events.
15 Furthermore, status switches from prescription to non-prescription (Rx-to-OTC switch ) are not a feature of the AD drug market. Sandoz has zero expenditure in some months while more than e2m in others.
Pharmaceutical Demand
Utility maximizing in pharmaceutical markets is not straightforward, demand structures are complex and involve multiple parties. For example, insurance policies dene benets and patients rely on the recommendations of physicians who might have their own preferences for particular brands or active ingredients. I assume that patients appreciate advice from experts in experience good markets (Hilger et al., 2011) . They maximize utility jointly with their physician and pharmacist by selecting a drug (Carrera et al., 2017; Kesternich et al., 2015) . Patients can inuence their drug choice by, rst, asking their doctors for a specic brand.
16 Second, patients could choose a particular brand (or 16 Previous studies show that physicians' patterns to prescribe is driven by requests of patients (Kravitz et al., 2005) . Reports from the US state that 78 percent of primary care physicians were asked by their patients for specic drugs which they had seen directly advertised (ISMP, 2015) . Most likely, the effect is smaller for advertising spillovers. My model of advertising allows spillovers of the brand name, However, patients consume the advertising of OTC drugs including information on brand names. Individual utility of patient i for product j in period t is dened as:
where rm f (j) sells products j. Price of product j is p jt , ζ j are time-invariant drug characteristics, ψ t are market xed-eects, ξ jt are unobserved eects on utility, and ijt are a consumer-product-specic error terms. The term σp jt ν ijt captures individual disutility for prices. Advertising, a f (j)t , enters as a state variable which consists of current and past advertising expenditures discounted by the optimal depreciation rate as described in Equation 2.
17 Prices, p jt , are the prices of manufacturers per dened daily dose (DDD).
Although consumers bear co-payments, a function of prices, the strategic variable of rms, physicians, health insurances, and pharmacists are prices. The random coecient allows heterogeneous individual preferences for prices. Utility can be decomposed into an individual part, σp jt ν i + ijt , and the mean utility which is the same for all patients: δ jt = −αp jt + γa f (j)t + ζ j + ψ t + ∆ξ jt . I control for time-invariant unobserved and observed i.e., between drugs from the same rm but not to competitors' drugs. In industries where advertising spillovers contain information about the promoted product, spillovers can result in free-riding of competitors (Shapiro, forthcoming) . 17 My model is similar to Murry (2015) for automobile demand, Nevo (2001) for cereals, or Chintagunta (2002) for analgesics. Shapiro (forthcoming) and Dubois et al. (2014) show theoretical dynamic considerations. drug characteristics and global shocks by product and time xed-eects which redenes the unobserved part of utility as ∆ξ jt . Utility can be rewritten as:
Patients and physicians jointly maximize utility and the error terms ijt are assumed to be independently and identically extreme value type I distributed.
18 The choice probability of drug j for consumer i at time t can be written as:
where θ = [α, β, γ, σ]. The assumption that ν is distributed with p.d.f. dP ν allows to sum up individual choice probabilities as:
Section 3.3 describes in more detail the numerical solution of integral 6 and the role of unobserved characteristics, ξ jt .
The logit model includes an option to not buy Alzheimer's disease drugs which is a composite outside good. The outside good also comprises the option to buy other treatments, such as cognitive training applications or personal memory training, and its normalized indirect utility is u i0t = i0t . I calculate the total market size, M , by daily doses potentially consumed by all Alzheimer's disease patients per month.
19 The total market size increased from about 900k to 1.1m patients from 2000 to 2010 and results in about 30m potentially consumed daily doses per month.
18 Logit demand models are special cases of the random coecients models and assume σp jt ν ijt = 0. Section 4 presents mean utility estimates as a benchmark case (u ijt = δ jt + ijt ). 19 Since age is the main risk factor for Alzheimer's disease, I collect historic age-specic prevalence rates from the German College of General Practitioners and Family Physicians (Degam, 2015) and the European Collaboration on Dementia Project (Eurocode, 2015) . Using epidemiological data adds exogenous variation to our estimation. About 5 percent of the population aged over 65 and 20 percent of the population aged over 80 are diagnosed with dementia, whereof about 65 percent are associated with the Alzheimer's disease (Degam, 2015; Eurocode, 2015) .
I argue that the potentially unobserved purchasing patterns of patients, for example, stock-piling or correlated purchases of prescription and OTC drugs, are not biasing my results: rst, seasonal demand uctuation are not a feature of the observed drugs treating chronic diseases. Second, the standardized German health insurance design does not feature a deductible, which could also explain stock-piling toward the end of the year (Einav et al., 2015) . Third, physician budgets would suggest fewer and not more prescriptions toward the end of the budget period (which is end-December). Fourth, given the dierent procedures for buying a prescription drug and OTC cold remedies, it seems unlikely that chronically ill patients would pick up their prescription before buying u treatment in November. For example, it would imply a visit to the neurologist (or geriatric doctor) to pick up a prescription for a chronic disease while suering from the u. Also, the density of pharmacies in Germany alleviates transaction costs for visits (1 pharmacy per 3,800 inhabitant). Fifth, an empirical test follows the economic intuition that state-dependency aects consumer choices in the current period as a function of decisions from previous periods (Shcherbakov, 2016) . In particular, I estimate the following specication,
where s jt are market shares of product j in period t. Exogenous variables, i.e., prices, product and period xed-eects, are captured by V jt and market shares from the previous periods,ŝ jt−1 , are instrumented with V jt−1 . In my data, patients buy a new drug package every 6 weeks on average. Therefore, the estimates test for the state-dependency of market shares lagged by two month. Table 6 presents the lagged coecient for market shares, ψ, that are not dierent from zero. My results indicate absent state dependency in demand.
Moreover, state dependency of demand might be an issue when switching poses medical risks at the curative treatment, which is not the case for AD drugs (NICE, 2011).
Identication and Estimation
The estimation strategy for the demand model in 3.2 follows the algorithm of Berry et al. (1995) and extends it in several dimensions (Reynaert and Verboven, 2014; Hess et al., 2006) . Product xed eects account for the simultaneity problem of the mean utility δ (Nevo, 2001) . Therefore, the ∆ξ are mean independent of non-price attributes. I address the endogeneity of the structural model by using instrumental variables and estimate the model with generalized method of moments (GMM). My moment conditions relate the structural error term, ∆ξ jt , and a set of instrumental variables:
where X jt (θ) contains all observable characteristics and Z jt are instrumental variables.
First, variation of sales over time and changing choice sets (because of entry and exit) help to identify the random coecient (σ) (Sovinsky Goeree, 2008) . Additionally, I use optimal instruments in the sense of Chamberlain (1987) , namely the expected value of derivatives of the unobserved quality of each product with respect to the parameter of the random coecient σ:
I follow the approximation of optimal instruments by Reynaert and Verboven (2014) where a rst-stage with instrumental variables, Z jt , predicts prices and derivatives of the mean utility are calculated with respect to the variance coecient, σ, in the form
I follow Appendix A in Reynaert and Verboven (2014) to approximate for instruments under imperfect competition with a sample of k = 1000.
Second, if rms invest in OTC advertising to strategically inuence prescription drug sales the endogeneity of advertising poses diculties for identication. Also, I do not observe detailing (physician-directed advertising) which might be correlated with drug sales or consumer-directed advertising. I instrument advertising spillovers by exploiting seasonal illnesses, like colds, which are independent of the timing of the prescription drug market.
Third, as a cost-shifter for the supply side, I use crude oil prices (Brent Europe) from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (Bresnahan, 1987) . Crude oil is an important production input of pharmaceuticals and unlikely to be correlated with unobserved product-specic demand shocks. The instrument is interacted with active ingredients to increase its exibility.
Fourth, I use traditional BLP-style instruments and construct the statistical means of product characteristics of competitors (Berry et al., 1995) . The main assumption is that characteristics of products of competitors and the product's location in the characteristics space are exogenous. Endogenous quality choice of rms, e.g., the choice of product characteristics in the short run (Crawford, 2012) , is not an issue in the pharmaceutical industry since products are either an outcome of an uncertain investment in research or the result of regulatory changes, e.g., patent duration. In particular, I include the mean DDD per package of all competitors in the active ingredient class, the mean product age of all competitors, the mean package size of all competitors, and quadratic polynomials of all variables. 
The optimal value for σ from the BLP estimation is denoted σ opt . Own-and crosselasticities of market shares with respect to advertising are calculated by:
Since advertising expenditures vary by company, I calculate advertising elasticities by rms. Cross-advertising elasticities are calculated between f (j) and f (k), the rms owning product j and k.
Supply Side
I model the supply of prescription drugs as an oligopoly game where rms strategically choose prices and advertising expenditures. My analysis abstracts from entry and exit 20 I use 5,000 pseudo-random draws using Modied Latin Hypercube Sampling (Hess et al., 2006) and 100 randomly sampled starting values to identify robust coecients.
considerations and takes market structure as given.
21 The oligopoly models of imperfect competition seem to be a good t for therapeutic drug markets where patented (originals and imports) and generic drugs compete for market shares (Dubois and Lasio, 2014; Kaiser et al., 2014; Dutta, 2011) . High (sunk) xed costs for research and development and moderate costs of production characterize the supply side of drug markets (Dutta, 2011) .
Firms maximize prots by setting prices in the prescription drug market and advertising expenditures in the OTC market. The latter are freely set by rms depending on the marketing strategy of their OTC drug portfolio. I assume advertising as a xed cost of production which is sunk after investment. Firms decide each period on their advertising stock. The model captures advertising stocks as the geometric sum of current and past advertising expenditures with the estimated optimal depreciation rate.
Prots of rms depend on revenues from all marketed products, including OTC drugs and non-medical drugs. I model revenues from the Alzheimer's disease prescription drug market. The market consists of F rms, each of which markets a subset F f of the j = {1, ..., J} drugs in market t = {1, ..., T } . The prot functions of multi-product rms f over prescription drugs are:
where p jt is the price of product j and c jt the marginal costs of the same drug. Market shares are a direct function of all price vectors in time t, p t , and of all advertising stocks, a t . Advertising expenditures of rm f (j) are denoted exp f (j)t , total market size is M t , and C f (j) are xed costs of production.
After observing demand factors, rms maximize revenues by setting optimal prescription drug prices and advertising expenditures. In a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, under the assumption of strictly positive support, every price for product j must satisfy the rst-order condition:
21 In the sample only generics and imports enter the market, which indicates regulation as being the main driver of market structure, e.g., patent duration or reference pricing.
Assumptions on the code of conduct of the pharmaceutical industry allow to derive markups (p jt − c jt ) and marginal costs for every product.
Simulation
By comparing the simulated market outcome without advertising spillovers to the status quo, I explain how to quantify the economic eects of umbrella branding. In the counterfactual scenario the eects of umbrella branding are zero and prices are the only strategic variable of the rms. My assumption that other variables, including marginal costs and physician-directed advertising, are unaected by the policy is in line with previous research (Nevo, 2001 ). The assumptions hold in the short run because rms cannot immediately adjust drug portfolios. If the ban of consumer-directed advertising result in higher spending on physician-directed advertising, I would overestimate the eect of an advertising ban. The counterfactual results are subject to the usual partial equilibrium critique.
Formally, the new price equilibrium, denoted by p 0 t , must fulll for all products j the rst-order conditions:
where advertising stocks are zero, a t = 0. Market shares for product j are given by:
where a t = 0 and prices are optimal prices in the non-advertising state, p 0 . The set of product characteristics, X 0 , does not contain advertising stocks. For the counterfactual price equilibrium, I solve for equations 14 and 15 numerically.
For the welfare calculation, I assume that patients choose products consistent with their underlying preferences. Advertising does not distort consumers and lead to choices inconsistent with utility maximization (Dubois et al., 2014) . The coecient for advertising can be interpreted as the valuation of the consumer for umbrella branding. Results of the simulated equilibrium and the estimated demand system are inputs for the approximation of consumer surplus. The monetary value of welfare changes due to the advertising ban is calculated by the Hicksian compensation variation, measured by solving the integral over the dierences in maximum expected utilities using numerical simulations (Small and Rosen, 1981; Kaiser et al., 2014) : and prices. For a more complete welfare analysis, I report revenues and public health insurance expenditures for the two scenarios in the AD drug market. Formally, the change in producer surplus is dened as:
and p t and q t are vectors of all prices and quantities (s t * M t ). 22 Vectors from the counterfactual scenario are denoted p 0 t and q 0 t .
Results
Results of the rst column in Table 3 , Logit-IV, assume homogeneous preferences of patients regarding prices. The specication uses instruments for prices and advertising to control for changes in unobserved product characteristics. Results show a negative price coecient, i.e., price-sensitive consumers, and a positive coecient for advertising spillovers.
The second column in Table 3 shows results of the random coecient model and allows the individual disutility of prices. The mean price coecient is negative and the random coecient is .34 and is interpreted as the standard deviation from the mean valuation of prices. Table 3 presents median own-price elasticities of -1.28.
23
The coecient for 22 Advertising spending, exp f t , aects the demand of all products of rm f , particularly of OTC drugs, and are part of the prot function. Since it is impossible to say what part of the advertising expenditure is accrued by the AD market, by assumption, exp f t = 0 in the AD market. Advertising expenditures are xed costs and are assumed to be sunk. 23 Reference pricing (Kaiser et al., 2014) and tiered co-payments (Herr and Suppliet, 2017) result in price-sensitive behavior of patients. A generic market share of almost 70 percent constitutes a competitive generic market in Germany. My results are close to estimated own-price elasticities from other random Notes: Logit IV and Logit with random coecients use instruments for prices and advertising, F-values of rst stage regressions are x (price) and x (advert.). Taste coecients for the characteristics are retrieved from a regression of the product xedeects on mean product attributes (N = 106, R 2 adj = .78) (Nevo, 2001) . Elasticities for price and advertising are calculated based on formula 11 and 10. The estimation RC Logit uses 5,000 modied latin hypercube sampling draws to simulate market shares. Constant not reported. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses; * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. umbrella branding is positive and statistically dierent from zero. The median elasticity of umbrella branding is .145.
All specications comprise product and time xed-eects. In empirical demand models with product xed-eects, a minimum-distance procedure can identify taste parameters (Chamberlain, 1982 ) (see Appendix 5). I nd that consumers put a higher value on drugs from originators and on some molecules, e.g., galantanin and rivastigmin. Utility increases for newer drugs and package size is not relevant. Table 4 presents results of the eect of umbrella branding on prices, quantities, and welfare measures. The results stem from the simulation in section 3.5.
Economic Eects of Umbrella Branding
First, umbrella branding has an impact on the number of treated patients. About 10 percent more drugs are sold with advertising compared to the same market without advertising. Quantities of generics increase by about 6.5m daily doses and of originators by 1.5m. Changes for imports are negative and small. From a health policy perspective, the increase in daily doses might aect the health status of the population. In particular, the patient population of under-treated conditions would benet from more medication, e.g., Alzheimer's disease patients (Sano et al., 2005) . Generalizing the ndings is dicult because the market expansion of overtreated drugs, e.g., by opioids (Alpert et al., 2017) , harm the health status of patients.
Second, spillovers of advertising on the demand for prescription drugs increases the market shares of generic rms by approximately 25 percent and of originators by 3.4 percent (compared to the outside good). Firms with high expenditures for advertising benet the most: the data shows that generic rms and originators possess stocks of advertising expenditures of, on average, e7.3m and e2.2m. The eect on market shares is negative for imports (-2.3 %). Patients seem to switch to the brand names that they know from consuming OTC drug advertising.
Third, price changes are small and positive for all drug types. Generic rms increase prices the most because they need to recover costly advertising, partially by higher prices.
Most likely, originators have high margins which allow them to invest in advertising coecient logit demand models in pharmaceutical markets. Kaiser et al. (2014) report mean own-copayment elasticities of -1.19, Chintagunta (2002) of -2.5, and Dubois and Lasio (2014) of -3.49. The welfare eects based on the expansion of pharmaceutical markets should be evaluated with caution. Some therapeutic markets are already overtreated, such as with opioids, and a market expansion would be harmful to patients. Undertreated conditions, however, would benet from more medicated patients, e.g., the Alzheimer's disease (Sano et al., 2005) . For preventive therapies, the treatment of an acute outbreak can result in high costs. Health insurances might justify expenditures for additional preventive pharmaceuticals to avoid follow-up costs. Positive spillovers on prescription drugs imply more advertising in the OTC market than in an isolated market. Too much OTC advertising could result in more demand for OTC products and might, in extreme cases, result in adverse health eects. The possibility of the overuse of OTC drugs seems relatively unlikely since in Germany they consist largely of herbal molecules and low-dosage molecules.
If an eective ban of advertising is of interest to regulators, they might adapt the institutional design of drug market policies. Policymakers could cooperate to adapt guidelines for drug packaging, for example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC ) and the FDA.
If similarity of product names or the umbrella branding of a product portfolio confuses patients, clear guidelines for product packaging and marketing could ultimately assist consumers. The existence of spillovers urges the development of guidelines for drug labeling, for example, the display of active ingredients on the package (ISMP, 2015) .
Another aspect is the strategic implication for rms. For example, in some markets, like the AD drug market, the advertising eects might be larger for generic rms than for originators. As a policy to promote generic substitution, regulators could promote the advertising of generic drug manufacturers in order to increase their market shares.
Moreover, some originators, such as Pzer, have been in the market for several decades while others are newly established brand names, e.g., through mergers. For example, Bronnenberg et al. (2012) nd long-lasting eects of brand capital for consumer goods in supermarkets. To disentangle the eects of established brand names and of advertising in the pharmaceutical industry is a promising topic for future research.
APPENDIX A Taste Parameters and Brand Fixed Eects Nevo (2001) and Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) suggest projecting the vector of brand dummy coecients from the demand estimation (Equation 3) onto product characteristics. Formally, the term d denotes the product dummy coecients, X the matrix of time-invariant product characteristics such as package size, import label, drug age, concentration, and molecule. ξ are unobserved product characteristics. From the individual patient utility function follows:
The assumption E[ξ j |X j ] = 0 allows us to estimateβ, the taste parameters for product characteristics (Nevo, 2001) . The assumption originates in previous work to rationalize instrumental variables, e.g., Berry et al. (1995) . I collapse product characteristics at the product-level. 
